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Abstract. Due to several corruption allegations in 1998, au-
tomaker Daimler had to find a way out of negative publicity. This 
and other incidents stimulated Daimler in the beginning of 2011 
to expand their board of directors by one person that is respon-
sible for the new Integrity and Legal Affairs department.  
This article focuses on the significance of compliance with 
corporate and national regulations as a fact that has become 
increasingly important as regard for corporate social responsi-
bility grows. In fact, the rising number of country specific stand-
ards and early considerations of specific compliance require-
ments during the development process are just some of the evi-
dence that shows that CSR requirements for companies within 
the automobile industry are on the rise. Companies are requested 
to organize transparency and risk management. The furor about 
the Daimler corruption case expresses best how essential it is to 
have a profound CSR strategy and a whistleblower system em-
bedded within a company. The result of such corruption cases in 
large enterprises usually leaves an unpleasant bequest for all 
stakeholders that are part of the company. In accordance, many 
automobile manufacturer have to deal with direct effects such as 
a decline in sales and a loss of image.   
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Introduction 
Many companies in the automobile industry are facing compli-
ance offenses such as corruption. Therefore they are starting to 
set up positions for compliance authorities within the company. 
This case study shall give an overview of how the topic of cor-
ruption is handled in different car manufacturing companies, but 
especially at Daimler. In addition to that an approach of how 
corruption can be avoided and prevented shall be presented.  
Daimler is one of the most successful car manufacturers in the 
world. In 2011 the German enterprise had sales of €106.5 billion 
(of that, €39.4 billion in Western Europe and €19.8 billion in 
Germany). Headquartered in Stuttgart, the company’s board of 
directors consists of eight members. It includes chairman Dieter 
Zetsche as well as those responsible for the operating and func-
tional divisions: production and purchasing Mercedes-Benz Cars 
and Vans; Integrity and Legal Affairs; HRM and Personnel 
Director; Daimler Trucks; Greater China; Finances and Manage-
rial Accounting, Daimler Financial Services and Research and 
Development Mercedes-Benz Cars. The corresponding supervi-
sory board (Aufsichtsrat), consisting of ten shareholder repre-
sentatives and ten appointed employee representatives, approves 
the board of directors and makes important corporate decisions. 
Within the German Stock Index (DAX 30) the Daimler share 
(DAI) is rated as one of the largest individual values with 5.93 
percent (end of 2011) (Daimler Annual Report, 2011, cover 2). 
Daimler is a highly sophisticated and successful company. 
Hence it is even more fascinating how a company of that size can 
manage compliance. It may be assumed that size matters: the 
bigger the company, the harder it is to overview all incidents that 
might represent a breach of conduct. 
In one famous case, Daimler was accused of violating US law, 
particularly the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in 22 countries in 
the world between 1998 and 2008. Back then, Daimler was still 
in a joint venture with Chrysler and had a variety of US anchors, 
so it was liable under US law. The car manufacturer bribed pub-
lic officials of foreign countries such as Turkey, China and Rus-
sia.1 Payments were covered up as discounts and commissions in 
annual reports; the company used various third-party accounts, 
shell companies and artificial consulting agreements, to name but 
a few of the methods. After an investigation that lasted several 
years, Daimler ended up paying US$185 million in order to settle 
the case (Fischer et al., 2010, para 3). The settlement with the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the US De-
partment of Justice was reached – and investigation suspended – 
on the promise that Daimler builds a corruption-prevention sys-
1 Among the other countries in Europe were Croatia, Greece, Hungary, 
Montenegro, Latvia, Serbia; in Africa, there were incidents in Egypt, 
Ivory Coast, and Nigeria; in Asia, Indonesia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkmeni-
stan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. 
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tem. To ensure that Daimler complies correctly, the US authori-
ties appointed a monitor (with almost state attorney powers) 
within the company and continued to keep a tight watch over the 
firm for years (Hawranek, 2011). 
In 2012, Daimler again faced negative publicity. Six former 
employees built up a system of bribery in cooperation with a 
German contracting quality company, Bayerisches Hüttenwerk 
Sonthofen (BHS), which reworks on certain parts. Two former 
Daimler employees and four BHS employees were sentenced to 
six to nine months prison terms on probation.  
Both cases are representing only a small pitch out of many dif-
ferent incidents but they provide insight of what can happen if 
corruption is not put under control. The failure of Daimler’s 
corporate culture and its compliance structure were all too obvi-
ous. Daimler, however, learnt from it and improved the situation 
through a fundamental change within its business organization 
(Wicke-Naber, 2012). 
Integrity and compliance  
Establishing the corporate field Group Compliance in 2006, 
Daimler started to create awareness towards the topic of compli-
ance. The field of Group Compliance is affiliated to the func-
tional division Integrity and Legal Affairs which is managed by 
the Group Chief Compliance Officer, Volker Barth. The organi-
zational orientation lies upon all business areas of Daimler 
(Daimler Corporate Governance, 2012).  
In 2011 Daimler additionally built up another board area, the 
so called Integrity and Legal Affairs division, managed by Chris-
tine Hohmann-Dennhardt. The new department comprises the 
treatment of corporate legal affairs, the organization of compli-
ance and the observance of data protection. Besides that the 
Integrity and Legal Affairs division wants to raise corporate 
awareness towards the responsibility to respect and protect hu-
man rights as well as to anchor a sustainable culture of integrity 
(Daimler Board of Management, 2012). 
Daimler’s compliance program is based on a global systematic 
risk analysis which is enforced on an annual basis. In dependence 
of the risk situation, the affected business unit has to go through 
a set of various actions (e.g. additional compliance trainings).  
The main goal of that program is to promote compliant work 
and prevent misbehavior, such as the involvement in corruption 
cases. In fact, corruption is the main focus of Daimler’s compli-
ance program and has highest priority.  
Nevertheless, corruption represents only one part of the corpo-
rate governance. Daimler’s compliance program rather includes 
compliant acting of each individual employee, which shall be in 
accordance to all applicable laws, voluntary commitments and 
internal corporate regulations.  
One tool that helps Daimler to prevent such misbehavior is the 
“whistleblowing” system administered by the Business Practices 
Office (BPO), implemented in 2006. The BPO system gives each 
employee and any stakeholder the possibility to alert the BPO to 
suspected offenses and misconduct; the BPO promises informers 
fairness, protection against reprisal and confidentiality (i.e. where 
data privacy laws allow, anonymity).  
Another part of the program is the administrative recording of 
a fundamental code of conduct. Daimler summarizes its princi-
ples within The Standards of Compliant Behavior. This includes 
all rules and standards which are internally defined as a good 
management approach. They consist of several documents and 
regulations and are based on fundamental corporate values 
(Daimler Corporate Governance, 2012). 
Compliance in the auto industry 
Daimler is not the only company which might be seen as a rot-
ten apple in the automobile industry. One of the biggest breaches 
of compliance in the last couple of years represents the corrup-
tion incidents at MAN Nutzfahrzeuge, another leading automo-
tive manufacturer in the world, legendary for its trucks (Hoff-
mann, 2012, para. 1). A former managing director of MAN 
subsidiary Neoman was accused of paying bribes of some 
€401,000 to a potential purchasing company in 2004. The money 
was used to support an adjudication of an order of 39 busses in 
Oslo. A Munich regional court condemned the manager to a ten-
month suspended jail sentence and a payment of €60,000 to 
charities (Ex-Managerin von MAN, 2012). 
Other recent news reports mention corruption cases at Ford 
and Mazda Europe. Ford was accused of bogus transactions with 
spare parts which were never distributed. In fact there are now 
three large-scale lawsuits running. The estimated amount of loss 
is up to a double-digit million Euro sum. One of three cases in 
which Ford was involved is bribe taking. Between 2003 and 
2010 Ford executives who were in charge of new construction 
and modernization of production facilities in Europe received 
bribery payments in the amount of at least €1.2 million in cash 
(Verfahren gegen hundert Beschuldigte, 2012). 
Mazda faced allegations of tax fraud and disloyalty. Mazda’s 
former vice president for public relations admitted the compli-
ance breach and terminated his employment with immediate 
effect in March 2012 (Razzia bei Mazda, 2012, p. 16). 
It seems like no automobile company can bypass the topic of 
corruption within their business operations. But one possibility is 
to contain and defeat any corruption attempt at the roots, i.e. to 
address the causes rather than the symptoms.  
There are many different approaches how risks of compliance 
can be monitored and managed. As mentioned in the previous 
section, Daimler decided to establish a whole new division under 
a board member.  
Correspondingly, Volkswagen founded a new business unit 
called Governance, Risk and Compliance in 2010. The Chief 
Compliance Officer of the entire Volkswagen Group reports 
directly to the Volkswagen CEO. BMW decided to establish a 
compliance committee that reports to the board of directors. The 
topic compliance at BMW is partially attached to the finance 
department. The company sees here the biggest source of risks 
due to the fact that many regulations converge within finances 
(Hoffmann, 2012, para. 5). 
Risk management is arguably much more important to an 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) than to other firms in 
the auto supply chain. The key reason is protection of the brand 
and the effectiveness of damage control. An OEM is most likely 
to face some kind of broad image and reputational loss which 
then quickly affects sales and operations, whereas an automobile 
supplier may still directly communicate with his clients and 
counteract (Hoffmann, 2012, para. 5). 
Lessons and improvements 
There is no generally applicable rule to prevent corruption. But 
what can be done is to implement compliant behavior as part of 
the company’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy 
which addresses internal and external stakeholders. Large com-
panies spend much money on risk management in order to pre-
vent corruption incidents and its bad impacts on the company. 
These expenses may be more efficient and effective if coupled 
with a broader CSR approach and understanding.  
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Using complex computer tools 
In order to have a kind of universal system in every company 
sector, it makes sense to implement an IT system which monitors 
breaches against the principle of good faith. Anti-corruption IT 
tools build on the idea that computers can analyze human deci-
sion behavior, and corrupt behavior leaves typical trails of data 
on company systems. Sometimes the analysis is even called data 
forensics. The point is not only to collect evidence after the fact 
but to use its insights for anticipation and prevention. IT systems 
can also enhance the transparency of decisions and make (dele-
gated) managers’ authority more accountable. 
Anton Weig, a risk analyst in charge of automotive affairs at 
consultancy BearingPoint (as cited in Hoffmann, 2012), recom-
mends utilities which can be implemented in order to dam and 
prevent the risk of corruption and other disloyalties. These in-
clude for example the analysis and definition of risks which can 
occur in certain steps of business operations, for example finan-
cial flows within sales and purchasing as well as regarding inter-
nal and regulatory regulations within the development and pro-
duction process.  
Additional steps include adequate controls, workflows for 
breaking the rules and risk assessment procedures. But also 
classical IT tools for risk control are identity and access man-
agement solutions, which handle roles and access privileges, are 
still beneficial. In case of a transgression, the person responsible 
for it will be immediately contacted via his or her smart phone. 
Even more important are technologies such as business intelli-
gence and data mining programs that analyze the patterns of cash 
flows which are suspicious (para. 2). 
Such recommended practical tools are expensive but as the 
importance of compliance is growing, the more urgent it be-
comes to have an unwaveringly system of compliance monitor-
ing and control. This is not only true for companies within the 
automobile industry but for all large companies.  
Besides the aspect of decreasing the risks of compliance abuse, 
CSR comprises additional benefits for the company. Therefore 
Weber (2008, pp. 248-249) is recommending to be aware of the 
benefits of CSR wherein compliance is a part of it. The outcome 
of an implemented CSR strategy is including the following five 
positive business effects: 
• on company image and reputation, 
• on employee motivation, retention and recruitment, 
• cost savings, 
• revenue increases from higher sales and market share, 
• CSR- related risk reduction or management. 
Combining the technical and cultural 
Despite the proliferation of “tools,” there is still the general 
problem that there is no universal system for inspection and 
monitoring corruption-prone areas for possible breach of stand-
ards of conduct. For example, many IT providers offer software 
to help with the task. But every company has to be aware of its 
needs in order to find a suitable computer program.  
In addition to that, it is necessary to have a corporate CSR 
strategy that works hand in hand with such applicable IT tools. 
Both the technical and the strategic side can work together to 
improve abilities to critically analyze and evaluate the risks, and 
to address the rather complex web of human motivation and 
conduct. CSR strategy needs to be implemented within all busi-
ness areas. This ideally includes each individual employee of the 
company standing up for it. 
Without those conditions it makes no sense to have such soft-
ware, because there will always be a possibility to get around 
administrative procedures. That is one of the main drawbacks of 
CSR. Company culture has to be adjusted so that each employee 
would always act in good faith. Broader programs such as Daim-
ler’s BPO whistleblower system, identity and access manage-
ment solutions represent an inception of compliance awareness. 
It gives each individual employee the possibility to notify and to 
track down such incidents in order to help the company. 
As soon as a company is involved in corruption, its impacts 
may be overwhelming. Effects range from damaging people, 
physical assets, brands, employee morale and business continuity 
to disrupting entire organizations (Del Bosco and Misani, 2010). 
Developing a CSR strategy which refers to its fundamental cor-
porate beliefs outweighs disadvantages and external pressure (see 
Garay and Font [2011] for a comparative approach). 
Stakeholder risk  
Table 1 lists the most important internal and external stake-
holders of a generic car-manufacturing company. All of them 
belong to different major groups that have an interest in a system 
of keeping compliance at an automobile car manufacturer.  
 
Table 1: Stakeholders of an Automaker 
Internal stakeholders 
Employees of the company 
Shareholders of the company 
External stakeholders 
Customers and other customer-related (e.g. car dealers) 
External contracting companies (e.g. in postprocessing) 
External suppliers (e.g. for steel, plastics, lubricants, etc.) 
General government and public authorities 
Media 
Table 1: Internal and external stakeholders 
 
The Daimler company categorizes its stakeholders in depend-
ence on their involvement and influence on their business activi-
ties (Daimler Sustainability Report 2011, p. 26):  
• Customers  
• Employees and trade unions 
• Suppliers 
• Associations 
• Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
• Science and politics  
• Local authorities, residents and neighbors at their production 
facility  
Corruption is a topic which usually has a bad aftertaste when 
mentioning it within business operations, and particularly in 
external communications. Just because some people are very 
reluctant to actively pursue the topic does not mean, of course, 
that there are people who support a system of keeping compli-
ance and others who do not.  
An assumption that some stakeholders evidently promote cor-
rupt procedures within business operations is normally wrong. 
Certainly there are no stakeholders who would indeed say so 
unless it is part of their culture.  
There are some approaches to differentiate among stakeholders 
and their level of support for corruption (at least in a cultural 
sense, i.e. tolerance for corrupt practices as an attitude). On an 
international level, information of the possible range of corrup-
tion supportiveness can be inferred from the corruption percep-
tion index (CPI), which is a ranking published on an annual basis 
by Transparency International (TI).  
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“Country-specific business practices” 
In the Daimler 1998-2008 bribery cases, one stakeholder stood 
out: governments. In many countries, government officials made 
purchasing decisions for cars, busses and trucks. Daimler manag-
ers bribed them so the governments would prefer Daimler vehi-
cles over other brands.  
Government actors at any level can be important stakeholders, 
particularly when investing and operating in foreign countries. 
From permissions and licenses to customs and taxes to partnering 
with state-owned firms, public authorities may help or hinder 
business. In the auto industry, their public procurement is also a 
key ingredient of the stakeholder relationship.  
Most of the countries in which Daimler bribery happened were 
emerging markets. For the auto industry, emerging markets today 
are strategically important for sales growth as they are for manu-
facturing cars and car parts (much of which may be outsourced).  
Any market entry strategy must adapt to country-specific be-
liefs, business practices and take their behaviors into account. It 
is a necessary component for competition, particularly in emerg-
ing markets, according to Reimann et al. (2011, pp. 2-3). To 
globally operating multinational enterprises (i.e. such as the big 
auto manufacturers and their large suppliers), this represesents a 
very gray zone of corruption opportunities. A firm’s market entry 
strategy accepts, that business success depends on support given 
by the host government: “Such support might include a timely 
response to the firm's requests, the reduction of bureaucratic 
hurdles, fostering of a cooperative relationship by local decision 
makers, and the hassle-free granting of required licenses” (p. 5).  
The question is how to get the local government officials to 
cooperate. It is well known that supporting payments to officials 
are somehow tolerated as a standard business practice. Acting not 
corruptly seems to be a deviant behavior - not normal. It is con-
sequently not clear at all where the line between general country-
specific business practices and corruption can be drawn, espe-
cially when a country’s business culture values the exchange of 
gifts of considerable worth (rather than token, symbolic gifts) 
and favors to show interest and respect. This is not always linked 
to a financial transaction. But refusing to participate in that cul-
ture and relationship-building, may limit or even destroy busi-
ness opportunities (and personal success, for that matter).  
The Daimler cases make clear that the understanding of that 
gray zone also depends on the applicability of laws. Often it is 
not the local law of a host country which threatens a foreign firm 
with (enforceable and enforced) sanctions but a home country 
law or even third country law. Referring to the 2010 Daimler 
settlement, it was US-American law (i.e. the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977) which defined payments to foreign coun-
try officials as corruption.  
In contrast to that, German law defined bribery payments in 
foreign countries as indictable not until 1998. While obviously 
not all anti-corruption laws, regulations and codes effectively 
promote ethical conduct, introducing legal liability may raise 
managers’ attention in the context of their risk management 
approaches. 
National and international corruption regulations are becoming 
stricter, more corruption cases are pursued, and at the same time 
public awareness and publicity of the corruption topic is grow-
ing. One would assume that corruption incidents consequently 
would decrease rather than increase. As for Germany, recent 
statistics by the Federal Criminal Police paint a different picture 
(figure 1).  
Obviously, most cases are undetected and unreported, so one 
can only speculate about the dark figures’ proportions. The rec-
orded increase of offenses, however, does allow us to conclude 
that the recent change in public and media awareness and general 
moral climate may increase the chance of success for a compre-
hensive compliance system. More and more cases are being 
pursued and that builds up pressure on every individual employ-
ee in a company. Within that context one would assume that 
developing a company’s compliance culture represents a huge 
step for any entity. But there will never be a guarantee that a 
company will be “very clean” or have a perfect score, due to the 
fact that each individual employee makes his or her own choice.  
 
Figure 1: Corruption offenses in Germany from 2007 to 2011. 
Based upon numbers published by the Federal Criminal Police 
Office, BKA (2011, p. 7). 
Conclusion 
The global automotive industry surely is a “risk industry” 
when it comes to bribery and other non-compliance of legal and 
ethical rules. No company within the automobile industry can 
stay away from corruption. Every company that is operating on 
an international and national level will face corruption at some 
point. The question is how it will respond to it. Analytical tools 
and company procedures can help to avoid and prevent the 
chances of corrupt business procedure but cannot guarantee for 
actions that are done by individual employees. The limits of 
“technical” tools are clear, and a cultural and moral approach is a 
necessary part of the strategy – which is where a more compre-
hensive, values-based CSR understanding comes in. It is advisa-
ble for a company to have additional regular compliance train-
ings in connection with tests that secure that the company’s 
compliance standards are not only communicated but lived. At 
the end of the day, anti-corruption risk control and CSR are just 
but two faces of the same coin: ethical business conduct.  
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